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BERGY, FLOOK, AND MICROORGANISMS AS
PATENTABLE PRODUCTS
Pursuant to its constitutional power to secure for inventors the exclusive
right to their inventions for a limited time,' Congress enacted the Patent
Code in 1790.' The purpose of the Code was to encourage the develop-
ment of useful technology and to disseminate knowledge so that both the
"useful arts" and free enterprise would flourish.' Realizing it could not
anticipate the scope of future technological advancement, Congress set
forth a broad definition of patentable subject matter to include any useful
art, manufacture, or machine or any new and useful improvement of
them.4 Although this definition has remained virtually intact since the
original statute's passage,5 the kinds of patentable inventions have
changed significantly. In this century, chemical, mechanical, and electrical
contrivances have comprised the bulk of patentable subject matter. Re-
cently, however, as life forms have begun to demonstrate a commercial
I. The Constitution gives Congress the express power to grant patents and "To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376
(1976)). The inventor's protection lasted for 14 years under the first Act. It was later ex-
tended to 17 years. Patent Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246 (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976)).
3. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-82 (1974). Granting patents
strengthens free enterprise in two ways. First, it encourages competition among inventors.
The first inventor to conceive and patent an invention acquires the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling that invention for a limited term. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
Second, when a patented invention is marketed, it spurs others in the field to develop a
competing but noninfringing product, see Potts v. Coe, 145 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1944), or
to improve on the original patented invention by developing more beneficial or economical
alternatives, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-101 (1976) (improvements on patented inventions are pat-
entable). Moreover, the patent law stimulates competitive markets in new technologies by
exacting public disclosure of inventions as a quidpro quo for the limited protection, thereby
facilitating the flow of new information to potential inventor-competitors. For a discussion
of economic objectives of the patent law, see Chief Justice Burger's opinions in Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-82 (1974), and C.H. Boehringer Sohn v. Watson, 256
F.2d 713, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (Burger, J., concurring).
4. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 191
(1976)).
5. The present Patent Code provides in pertinent part that "whoever invents or discov-
ers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The primary "conditions and require-
ments" pertaining to patentability are codified in §§ 102, 103, and 112 of the Act. See notes
21-24 and accompanying text infra.
Catholic University Law Review
potential not previously contemplated, the biological sciences have become
a source of useful inventions.6
Despite its goal of fostering technological advancements, the patent sys-
tem has been hesitant to accept these biological inventions within the
realm of patentable subject matter. This reluctance was manifested in the
nineteenth century when the patent office promulgated a policy against
patenting plants.7 More recently, this reluctance has hampered attempts to
patent inventions based on microbiological advancements.8 Not until In re
Bergy were the myriad of policy considerations restricting the patentabil-
ity of microorganisms finally overcome. In Bergy the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) held that section 101 of the Patent
Code does not exclude microorganims from patent protection solely be-
cause they are "alive." 9
This note will explore the statutory matrix in which the controversy over
patenting microorganisms has developed and evaluate the policy consider-
ations offered by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and examined
by the courts in adjudicating the patentability of microorganisms.
I. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE
PATENT CODE
The scope of patentable subject matter is governed by section 101 of the
Patent Code.' ° This section establishes three requirements for patentable
inventions. First, an invention must fall within one or more of four broad
statutory categories; namely, process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
6. See, e.g., Mercke & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1958) (method of producing vitamin B12 from cattle livers held patentable); Guarantee
Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), a f'd, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir.
1932) (patent upheld on bacteriological process for the production of acetone and alcohol);
Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
209 U.S. 548 (1908) (use of anaerobic bacteria in sewage purification process held patenta-
ble). See also Ellison, Firm Pushes Aheadin Genetics, Washington Post, July 5, 1979, § A, at
9, col. 1.
7. For example, patents could not be secured for plants prior to 1930, since their or-
ganic nature was assumed both to present unsoluble problems in satisfying the statutory
requirement of description of the invention now codified in § 112, see notes 23-24 and ac-
companying text and note 42 infra, and perhaps exclude them from potential categorization
as inventions. See Exparte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123. Congress later remedied this
situation by enacting the Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976). See notes 42-47 and
accompanying text infra.
8. The Patent Office has offered several policy reasons in support of its reluctance to
patent microbiological inventions. See notes 42-47 & 119-28 and accompanying text infra.
9. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3283 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1979) (No.
79-136).
10. See note 5 su pra.
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tion of matter." These categories are divisible into two general classes:
process and product inventions. A process invention generally consists of
a new art or method of achieving a useful end.' 2 Product inventions en-
compass the three remaining statutory categories and comprise any new
and useful apparatus, article, or substance. 13
The second prerequisite is that of "utility," requiring the invention to
have the capacity to perform the function ("product" invention) or attain
the result ("process" invention) claimed in the application's description. 14
11. The term "machine," as used in § 101, refers to any mechanical device, or combina-
tion of mechanical powers and devices, that performs some function and produces a certain
effect or result. See Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853). A "manufac-
ture" is any useful product made directly or indirectly by human labor and derived from
either raw materials or from materials worked into a new form. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
870 (5th ed. 1979). The term "composition of matter" refers to a substance composed of two
or more different substances without regard to form. [d at 259. Although the terms "manu-
facture" and "composition of matter" are stated separately in the Code, they have been
treated in commentary as functionally indistinguishable. See Frederico, Section 101: Sub-
ject Matterfor Products, in THE LAW OF CHEMICAL, METALLURGICAL AND PHARMACEUTI-
CAL PATENTS 53, 58 (H. Forman ed. 1967).
12. The term "process" is defined by the Patent Code as a "process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or
material." 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1976). This definition was added in the Patent Act of 1952 to
resolve possible semantic discrepancies between the terms "process," "method," and "art,"
all of which are virtually synonomous for patent law purposes, and to clarify that a new use
of an old product or process is patentable if both "novel" and "nonobvious" to one skilled in
that particular field. See H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
14. See CBS v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 415 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1061 (1970); Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1957) (utility implies capacity
to perform function or attain result claimed in applicant's disclosure). In addition, the util-
ity standard requires that the invention not be injurious to public health and safety. Inven-
tions "injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of society" have been held to
lack the utility necessary to constitute patentable subject matter. See Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966). Thus, inventions which would defraud the public fail to meet the
utility standard. See Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1925)
(process for making imitation seam for seamless stockings to make them resemble silk stock-
ings held unpatentable); Rickard v. DuBon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900) (process for marking
tobacco leaves of inferior variety to resemble a superior variety held unpatentable). But see
Denton v. Fulda, 225 F. 537 (2d Cir. 1915) (simulated precious stones held patentable); In re
Corbin, 6 F. Cas. 538 (D.C. Cir. 1857) (No. 3,224) (imitation honey is useful and therefore
patentable). A more difficult balancing situation arises when beneficial inventions are also
potentially harmful. See In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (beneficial drug
with potential adverse side effects held patentable). Therefore, absolute safety in an inven-
tion is not required under section 101. See In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
While the patent system has not been insensitive to the dangers inherent in many inventions,
the courts have held that Congress delegated to agencies other than the PTO the responsibil-
ity to determine whether an invention is safe enough for human consumption. See In re
Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (determination of whether a particular drug
is sufficiently safe rests with the Food and Drug Administration).
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The invention need only present a feasible means for achieving the ends
desired by its inventor; 15 the fact that additional research might be neces-
sary before an invention is perfected or made safe for public consumption
has been held to be immaterial. 6
Third, an inventor may not claim any of the "natural phenomena" oper-
ative in the invention in the patent application.' 7 The term "natural phe-
nomena" encompasses any organic or abstract constituent of an invention
such as naturally occurring plants, gravity, electricity, or a mathematical
theory or equation.' Although all inventions depend in some measure on
natural forces or phenomena for their efficacy, claims directed solely to
such phenomena instead of to new and useful applications of them have
been held unpatentable without exception.' 9 The rationale underlying this
proscription is that patents would deprive the public of access to natural
forces and dispossess researchers in the field of a basic tool.2"
Beyond the section 101 requirements, an invention must satisfy several
additional statutory conditions before being patentable.2' First, section
102 requires all patentable inventions to be "novel." If a claimed inven-
15. See CBS v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 415 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1061 (1970); Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1957).
16. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 433 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1970).
See In re Malachowski, 530 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
17. The term "natural phenomena" is not expressly mentioned in § 101. Instead, the
concept was created by case law interpreting § 101 and its predecessors. See, e.g., Gott-
schalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (mathematical formula held unpatentable for involving
natural phenomena); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (process for
mixing various species of bacteria unpatentable for involving natural phenomena); Exparte
Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123 (plants held unpatentable for involving natural phenom-
ena).
18. See I A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 22-23 (2d ed. 1964). See also
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAM-
INING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (1967) (naturally occurring substances do not fall into any of
the four statutory categories of § 101); Kip, The Patentability of Natural Phenomenon, 20
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 371 (1952). See generally notes 97-105 and accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). See notes 77-105 and accompanying text infra.
20. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). See I A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER
ON PATENTS § 23 (2d ed. 1964).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
to the date of the application for patent in the United States.
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tion had been either known, used, or described in a publication prior to the
applicant's claim, the invention is deemed to lack novelty and is therefore
unpatentable. Second, section 103 requires that an invention be "nonobvi-
ous." This section requires an investigation into the state of the art in the
field from which the invention originates to determine whether the "differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which [the] subject matter pertains." 2 Finally, section 112 of the Patent
Code requires a written description of the invention sufficient to enable
one skilled in the applicable field to practice it.23 This requirement is
designed to give notice of the invention to others in the field in order to
guard against infringement and to avail the public of the knowledge the
patent contributes to the art.24
Biological sciences, now a source of new and useful inventions, have
severely taxed the statutory requirements for patentable subject matter.
Biological inventions, seemingly within these statutory requirements on
their face, have presented new problems for the patent system with regard
to both the proscription against natural phenomena and the Supreme
22. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976), which provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). See generally In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
24. See Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 452 F.2d 163, 170 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 948 (1972); Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1241 (7th Cir.
1969).
Some inventions are difficult to describe with sufficient specificity to enable other inven-
tors to employ the invention. There are chemical inventions, for example, that encompass
thousands of compounds. Applicants in such situations are thus presented with the problem
of determining how many classes must be described individually in order to meet the
description requirements. In addition, in many chemical inventions there is no guarantee
that the combination of prescribed compounds will always result in the desired product or
that the product will achieve the desired results. See In re Angstadt, 532 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A.
1976). In such cases, rejection under § 112 will depend on the predictability of successful
productions of the desired end. Id For patentable inventions involving microorganisms, an
alternative method of satisfying § 112 has been developed in which a subculture of the mi-
croorganism is deposited at one of the national culture depositories. Thus, anyone wanting
to practice the invention after the patent has expired could simply obtain a sample from a
depository. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
1980]
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Court's narrow interpretation of legislative intent concerning patent pro-
tection for inventions from new and complex fields.
II. THE ADVENT OF COMMERCIALLY USEFUL MICROORGANISMS
In the last forty years, great advances have been made in microbi-
ology.25 Recent large investments in research aimed at the development of
new strains capable of performing important commercial functions 26 have
prompted corporations to seek patent protection for inventions involving
microorganisms. 27 Accordingly, the controversy over the patentability of
microorganisms began reaching the courts only a short time ago. The first
case addressing the patentability of processes employing microorganisms
did not reach the CCPA until 1974.28 Likewise, the patentability of "prod-
uct" microbiological inventions themselves did not reach the Supreme
Court until 1978.29
The patentability of an industrial process employing microorganisms
first arose in an infringement case,3° Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents
Corp. 31 In Guaranty Trust, the United States District Court for Delaware
upheld a patent on a bacteriological process for the production of acetone
and alcohol.32 The defendants had denied any infringement of the plain-
tiff's patent and alternatively attacked the patent's validity on several
grounds, including a claim that the process did not constitute patentable
subject matter since it was a "life process of a living organism. '33 The
district court rejected this contention, stating that the patent was not for
25. See Wegner, The Patentability of 'Wew Manufactures" - The Living Invention, in
1978 PATENT LAW CONFERENCE COURSEBOOK (BNA) 253, 272 [hereinafter cited as 1978
COURSEBOOK].
26. 1978 COURSEBOOK, supra note 25, at 280. These new strains aid in the inexpensive
production of useful drugs and chemicals, dissolve oil slicks, and perform other important
commercial tasks. Id at 280-82.
27. The real party in interest in patent applications often is not the individual inventor
but rather a corporate assignee of the invention. See, e.g., In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40
(C.C.P.A. 1978) (General Electric Co.); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Upjohn
Co.).
28. See In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974). See notes 35-36 and accompany-
ing text infra.
29. See Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). Although the issue of patenting microbio-
logical product inventions only recently reached the courts in this country, several other
countries have already approved the patentability of these inventions. See Cooper, Patent
Protectionfor New Form of Life, 38 FED. BAR J. 34 (1979).
30. Infringement occurs when one violates the right secured to the inventor by the pat-
ent law by manufacturing, using, or selling the patented process or product without the
patentee's permission. See Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146 (1st Cir. 1901).
31. 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), aft'd, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932).
32. 54 F.2d at 410.
33. Id
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bacteria per se but rather for a fermentation process employing bacteria.
Addressing the patentability of microorganisms as "products," however,
the court cautioned that "[wiere the patent for bacteria per se, a different
situation would be presented."34
The CCPA did not squarely address the patentability of processes in-
volving microorganisms until In re Mancy.31 In Mancy, the PTO had de-
nied the applicant's claim to a process for producing the antibiotic
daunorubicin on grounds that the "starting material" cultivated to produce
the antibiotic was "obvious" under section 103. The CCPA reversed, stat-
ing that the starting material in such a process (a novel microorganism)
need not itself be patentable in order for the process to be patentable. The
court cautioned in dicta, however, that the applicants "not only have no
allowed claim to the [microorganism] used in their pro&7ss but would...
be unable to obtain such a claim because the [microorganism], while new
in the sense that it is not shown by any art of record, is, as we understand
it, a 'product of nature."' 36 Thus, the court was careful to limit its holding
based on the possibility that the strain might constitute a natural phenome-
non.
The caution expressed in these cases has today ripened into a PTO pol-
icy of denying patents on microorganic product inventions until specific
legislation provides for these claims.37 This position has two bases. First,
the PTO contends that the Plant Patent Act of 193038 and the Plant Variety
Protection Act of 1970'9 illustrate the necessity of an express congressional
provision before granting patents on any living matter, including microor-
ganisms. Second, the PTO interprets the case law on the patentability of
computer programs to have pronounced a bar against granting patents in
technological areas unforeseen by Congress when it enacted the patent
statutes.4°
The purpose of the Plant Patent Act was to grant agricultural innovators
the same opportunity to reap the benefits of the patent system as had been
accorded industry.41 Under the Act, breeders were afforded patent protec-
34. Id
35. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
36. Id at 1294.
37. See notes 41-47 and accompanying text infra.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
39. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976).
40. See notes 48-69 and accompanying text infra.
41. Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the bill stated: "[Ijt is hoped
that the bill will afford a sound basis for investing capital in plant breeding and conse-
quently stimulate plant development through private funds." H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930); S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930).
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tion for certain kinds of asexually reproducing plants.42 The PTO main-
tains that this specially enacted legislation demonstrates congressional
intent that the patent law should not extend to living matter. If it did, then
presumably plants, as living things, would already have been patentable
under section 101, thus making a specific provision for plant patents un-
necessary.43 This position is supported by a letter from then Secretary of
Agriculture Hyde, appended to the contemporaneous House and Senate
committee reports on the plant patent bill, wherein the Secretary inter-
preted the existing patent laws to cover "only inventions or discoveries in
the field of inanimate nature."44
The PTO draws further support for its position from the Plant Variety
Protection Act of 1970.4' This Act empowers the Secretary of Agriculture
to issue certificates for new varieties of asexually reproduced plants.46 The
PTO contends that the Act, like the Plant Patent Act of 1930, extends pro-
tection to material not previously covered under section 101. This conten-
tion is consistent with congressional intent that living matter requires
special legislative action before qualifying for patent protection.47
42. The Act provided patent protection for any new and distinct variety of plant, "in-
cluding cultivated spores, mutants, hybrids and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber
propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state." 35 U.S.C § 161 (1976). The
reason why protection was not available under the existing patent statutes was not explicitly
discussed. It appears, however, that protection was unavailable before 1930 simply because
of a presumption that plants could not meet the statutory description requirement. See A.
ALLYN, THE FIRST PLANT PATENTS 58 (1934).
Prior to the Act, plant developers did not apply for patents, but appealed directly to Con-
gress for a special provision. See, e.g., H.R. 18851, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906) (a bill to
amend the laws of the United States relating to patents in the interest of the originators of
horticultural products); H.R. 5435, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892) (a bill for the advancement of
agricultural sciences). Similarly proposed bills include H.R. 24010, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1910); H.R. 21951, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908); S. 59, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1907).
That a plant patent applicant would have received a cold reception from the PTO before
1930 is supported by Exparte Latimer where rejection of a claim directed to the fiber of a
pine needle was affirmed by the Commissioner of Patents. 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123. The
Commissioner stated that granting patents in such circumstances would lead to the patent-
ing of "trees of the forest and plants of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable
and impossible." Id at 126.
43. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 12, Parker v. Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.
1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3283 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1979) (No. 79-136) [hereinafter cited as
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari].
44. See H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 app. (1930); S. REP. No. 315, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 app. (1930).
45. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976).
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976). The protection provided by these "certificates" authorized
under the Act embody the same legal rights and protections to the inventor. Unlike patents,
however, these certificates are administered by a special office in the Department of Agricul-
ture, not by the Patent and Trademark Office.
47. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 43, at 13, 14.
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The second basis for the PTO's denial of product patent protection for
microorganisms focuses on a series of cases rejecting patent applications
for computer programs on "natural phenomenon" grounds. In Gottschalk
v. Benson,48 one of the first Supreme Court cases on computer program
patentability, an applicant sought patent protection for a new method of
programming digital computers.49 The method consisted of a mathemati-
cal formula used by a digital computer to convert decimal numbers to pure
binary numbers. The formula had no substantial practical application ex-
cept in connection with the computer. In reversing the CCPA's finding
that the claims were patentable,5" Justice Douglas, writing for the major-
ity, observed that phenomena of nature, mental processes, and abstract in-
tellectual concepts - all descriptions applicable to the formula claimed -
"are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."'" Consequently,
a patent on the programming method would monopolize the formula and
effectively constitute a patent on the formula itself.52 The Court thus
found the method to be unpatentable as a "process" within the meaning of
section 101. 53 The Court suggested, however, that computer programs
were not per se unpatentable but stated that this area involved policy mat-
ters beyond the competence of the Court since "considerable problems
[were] raised which only committees of Congress [could] manage." 54
If any uncertainty remained after Benson as to the Court's attitude to-
ward patent applications for inventions involving natural phenomenon, it
was dispelled in Parker v. Fook.55 Flook strengthened and expanded Ben-
son by rejecting, for similar reasons, claims directed not to a computer
program itself, but to a process employing a program. In Flook, the appli-
cant claimed a method of controlling certain aspects of the catalytic con-
version of hydrocarbons, a process indigenous to petroleum refining and
48. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
49. Id at 65.
50. See In re Benson, 442 F.2d 687 (C.C.P.A. 1971). The C.C.P.A., in an opinion by
Judge Rich, held that the number conversion process did not constitute a "mental process"
and was therefore patentable under § 101. Id at 687.
51. 409 U.S. at 67. The Court stated that "he who discovers a hitherto unknown phe-
nomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to
be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature
to a new and useful end." Id at 71-72 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S.
127, 130 (1948)).
52. 409 U.S. at 71-72.
53. Id
54. Id at 72-73. It has been suggested that the Court may have been inconsistent here
since earlier in the opinion the Court stated that its decision did not preclude a patent for
any computer program. Id at 71. See Note, Parker v. Flook and Computer Program Pat-
ents, 30 HAST. L.J. 1627, 1632-33 (1979).
55. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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petrochemical processing. During the process, variables such as heat, pres-
sure, and reactant product flow rates are monitored. When the value for a
variable exceeds a predetermined alarm limit, for example, if a pressure
level becomes excessive, it must be corrected in order for hydrocarbon con-
version to continue. Correction is done by a computer using a mathemati-
cal control equation.56 Flook's claim covered the use of his discovered
formula for correcting the value of an alarm limit on any process variable
involved in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. 7
In holding Flook's invention to be patentable, the CCPA interpreted
Benson narrowly, stating that Benson's proscription was limited to claims
which monopolized a mathematical formula.58 The court then found that
Flook's application did not monopolize the formula because it claimed
only the method of correcting alarm limit values, i.e., an application of a
mathematical formula, not the formula itself. 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Flook's process
application was outside the statutory limit for two reasons. First, the
Court declared that a process invention that implements a principle in a
specific manner does not automatically comprise statutory subject matter
under section 101. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,6" reasoned
that, if this were so, satisfaction of section 101 would "depend simply on
the draftsman's art and would ill serve the principles underlying the prohi-
bition against patents for 'ideas' or 'phenomena of nature."' 6 Second, the
Court stated that the particular application of the formula to correct alarm
limits was not "inventive" and could not be since the formula must be
considered a familiar part of the prior art.6 a
On the issue of patenting the implementation of mathematical princi-
ples, prior case law, including Benson, had established that an invention
applying natural phenomena such as a mathematical formula in a new and
useful process constituted patentable subject matter. 62 Based on this pre-
cedent, the Court should merely have inquired whether Flook's invention
embodied a new and useful application of the natural phenomena in-
56. Id at 585-86.
57. Id
58. See In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
59. Id at 23.
60. Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
concluding that the invention was patentable because the formula involved comprised only
one step in the process, and thus no claim to natural phenomena had been attempted. 437
U.S. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 593.
61a. Id at 591-92.
62. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
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volved. An affirmative answer to that question would have resulted in the
Court's holding the invention patentable. By declaring that such an appli-
cation was no longer a satisfactory standard for patentability, however, the
Flook Court narrowly construed section 101 and abandoned this prior
case law.63 The Court gave no explanation for its deviation from prior
interpretations of section 10164 and proceeded as if only the patentability
of the formula itself was at issue. Since the Court never returned its focus
to the proper factual context, i e., the patentability of a claim to a process
employing a mathematical formula and not a claim to the formula itself,
its reasoning is disconcerting. Thus, after Flook, any claim in which natu-
ral phenomena play too prominent a part could be viewed as a camou-
flaged attempt to obtain protection for the phenomena themselves,65 and
on that basis be rejected.
The Court's second reason for rejecting Flook's claim, that the formula's
application was not "inventive," is no more persuasive than the first. The
House Report accompanying the latest reenactment of the Patent Code
explicitly states that the old "invention" requirement of section 103 is re-
placed by the new standard of "nonobviousness."66 Thus, since Flook
only involved the construction of section 101, the Court's discussion of
63. 437 U.S. at 593.
64. Id
65. See, e.g., In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (applying Flook).
66. The "inventiveness" requirement stems from an 1851 decision wherein the Supreme
Court stated a general condition of patentability:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute [sic] essential elements of every in-
vention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skilful [sic] mechanic,
not that of the inventor.
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851). The language in that case and
in later decisions "gave birth to 'invention' as a word of legal art signifying patentable inven-
tions." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). In John Deere, the Court said it
had often observed that the "invention" requirement could not be defined in a manner that
provided "any 'substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves an exer-
cise of the inventive faculty or not."' Id (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427
(1891)). This disparity between judicial interpretations of the invention requirement led
Congress in 1952 to enact the § 103 nonobvious requirement in the hope that it would "have
some stabilizing effect." Id at 16. See note 22 supra for the text of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
John Deere, then, delineated the factual inquiry to be undertaken pursuant to § 103 and
concluded that "strict observance of the requirements laid down here will result in that
uniformity and definiteness which Congress called for in the 1952 Act." Id at 18. For an
argument that nonobviousness is as incapable of precise definition as its predecessor inven-
tion requirement, see Schneider, Non-obviousness, the Supreme Court, and the Prospects for
Stability, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 304 (1978).
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"inventiveness" was unwarranted.67
Finally, the Court noted "difficult questions of policy" with respect to
the appropriateness of patent protection for computer programs, an issue
Congress was better equipped to decide.68 This expression of caution puts
prospective inventors on notice of the doubtful availability of patent pro-
tection for inventions involving sophisticated new technologies that the
patent system is not prepared to handle, at least until Congress has specifi-
cally so provided.69 Thus, Flook portends difficulty for the applicant
claiming patent protection for a product of "genetic engineering" since
such an invention embodying sophisticated and problematic technology is
likely to be rejected just as computer programs have been.
III. IN RE BERGY: MICROORGANISMS As PATENTABLE "PRODUCTS"
UNDER SECTION 101
After Flook, the Supreme Court remanded a case to the CCPA for it to
decide whether, in light of Flook, product patent claims to industrially use-
ful microorganisms should be denied because directed to living things. In
In re Bergy,70 the CCPA refuted the arguments of the PTO against patent-
ing living things, denied the applicability of Flook, and held that being
"alive" did not affect the patentability of the microorganisms.
Bergy involved two cases, both arising from rejections of "product" pat-
ent claims of microorganisms. In Bergy, the applicant invented a process
for the production of a familiar antibiotic, lincomycin, and, while doing so,
discovered a previously unknown microorganism which he called Strepto-
myces vellosus ("Sv"). Bergy filed both "process" and "product" claims
with the PTO. The process involved fermenting Sv in an aqueous nutrient
solution in order to produce lincomycin in recoverable quantities. 7' The
PTO held this process to be patentable. Bergy also claimed Sv itself as a
67. Indeed, discussion of "inventiveness" in any patent case is now considered irrele-
vant. See note 66 supra.
68. The Court stated that it "must proceed cautiously when ... asked to extend patent
rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." 437 U.S. at 596.
69. This uncertainty is especially pronounced in the computer software area. It has
been suggested that patent protection for software is inappropriate. See Davis, Computer
Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 1 (1977). The
essentially abstract nature of computer programs has even led to suggestions that software
fabricators should seek copyrights instead of patents. See Note, Intellectual Property Protec-
tion for Computer Programs: Are Patents Now Obtainable?, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 835 (1977).
70. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3283 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1979)
(No. 79-136).
71. The advantage of using Sv over S. lincolnensis, the former reactant, lies in Sv's
ability to produce lincomycin without concomitantly producing less valuable lincomycin B.
The result is more efficient recovery of lincomycin.
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"manufacture or composition of matter" under section 101, describing it as
a "biologically pure culture" of the microorganism Sv.72 The patent exam-
iner rejected Bergy's "product" claim as being directed to a product of
nature. 3 The PTO Board of Appeals upheld the rejection on the sole
ground that the claim covered a "living organism.""
On appeal, the CCPA reversed on the grounds that a biologically pure
culture of Sv was not a product of nature75 and that patentability was not
affected by the microorganism's being "alive.",76 The Supreme Court sub-
sequently vacated the decision and remanded it for further consideration
in light of Parker v. Flook, decided four days earlier.77 On remand, the
CCPA reheard Bergy together with another case, In re Chakrabarty,78 in-
volving the same issue of law.
In Chakrabarty, the PTO gave similar treatment to another inventor
with both "product" and "process" claims to a microorganism-related in-
vention. 79 The invention entailed the use of "genetic engineering" tech-
niques to create a microorganism capable of degrading oil spills.
Chakrabarty manufactured a new strain of bacteria capable of degrading
oil's several hydrocarbon components into a cell mass that would be con-
sumed by sealife. Existing strains were only able to degrade one compo-
nent at a time and as a result were ineffective.8" His "process" claim was
72. 596 F.2d at 967. In its natural state Sv is a useless component of Arizona soil.
Bergy reduced it, however, to a biologically pure culture, capable of producing lincomycin.
73. Id. at 972.
74. See Exparte Bergy, 197 U.S. PAT. Q. 78 (Bd. App. 1976). The "products of nature"
and "living organism" discussions in Exparte Bergy were substantially adopted by the PTO
Board of Appeals in deciding the Chakrabarty appeal. See 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
In Ex parte Bergy, the PTO took an unwavering stance against patenting microorganisms.
See 197 U.S. PAT. Q. at 79-80.
75. The court found that a basically pure culture of Sv is not a product of nature be-
cause it does not exist naturally but rather is man-made and producible only under carefully
controlled laboratory conditions. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1035 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
76. Id The court stated that the microorganism complied with all the statutory prereq-
uisites other than the enumerated statutory categories, and thus there was no reason to de-
prive its creator or owner of the protection and advantages of the patent system by excluding
it from those categories. Id at 1037-38.
77. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
78. 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
79. Chakrabarty's product claims to the microorganism were rejected by both the PTO
examiner and the PTO Board of Appeals. See In re Chakrabarty, No. 77-535 (Bd. App.,
May 20, 1976) (unreported decision), rev'd, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S.
801 (1978).
80. Using a mixture of existing strains on oil spills was ineffective because the metabolic
properties of the strains were such that only part of the initial combination of strains would
survive after intermixture. Thus, the bulk of an oil spill would remain unaffected, increasing
the probability of its spreading or sinking. 596 F.2d at 969. Chakrabarty mechanically in-
corporated compatible DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecules from four of the existing
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directed to the manner of application of the new bacterial strain to oil
spills, and the PTO held it patentable. His "product" claim to the new
strain itself was rejected by the PTO Board of Appeals, however, on prod-
uct-of-nature grounds, and because it was directed to live organisms.8
The CCPA reversed after reiterating the point it had made earlier in Bergy
that claims were not outside the statutory categories of section 101 merely
because they utilized living organisms.82
On remand, the CCPA, in an opinion by Judge Rich, essentially af-
firmed its two previous decisions and held that Bergy and Chakrabarty
claimed subject matter within the scope of section 101.83 Moreover, the
court found Flook to be inapplicable because it construed "process" under
section 101 while Bergy construed "manufacture or composition of mat-
ter," ie., product claims.84
Judge Baldwin concurred after having dissented in the first round of the
Bergy and Chakrabarty appeals. 85 He argued that Flook was controlling
through its stated prohibition on patenting natural phenomena. Since both
inventions involved nonnaturally occurring "products" not monopolizing
any natural phenomena, he believed that Flook confirmed the patentabil-
ity of their inventions. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Miller accepted the
PTO's argument that the Plant Patent Act of 193086 and the Plant Variety
strains into the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, thereby creating a strain with the ca-
pacity to degrade, by itself, all four main components of oil at once. See Gore, The,,wesome
Worlds Within a Cell, 150 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 355, 374-75 (1976).
81. The PTO Board of Appeals reviewed Chakrabarty's application before Bergy's.
82. See In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The CCPA did not address the
"natural phenomena" issue, after noting that the PTO Board of Appeals had conceded with-
out discussion that the organism was not a product of nature. Id. at 43. Judges Baldwin and
Miller dissented. Judge Baldwin essentially accepted the PTO's argument that the inven-
tion's being alive precluded it from patent protection. Id at 44 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
Judge Miller contended that the Plant Patent Act evidenced congressional intent that micro-
organisms were unpatentable. Id at 45 (Miller, J., dissenting).
83. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
84. Before discussing Flook, the majority set forth a method of construction of the stat-
utory requirements for patentability by comparing patentability to unlocking the three suc-
cessive doors of §§ 101, 102 and 103, respectively. Id at 959-64. The analogy represented
the court's view that these sections form three discrete stages of inquiry into patentability.
This discussion laid the foundation for its treatment of Parker v. Flook, since the court
perceived in Fook "an unfortunate and apparently unconscious" commingling of the "dis-
tinct statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated." Id at 959. The court noted
that the Supreme Court's "confusion" in Flook pertained to "the categories of inventions in
§ 101 which may be patentable and to the conditions for patentability demanded by the
statute for inventions within the statutory categories, particularly the nonobviousness condi-
tion of § 103." Id (emphasis in original). See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
85. See In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 44-45 (Baldwin, J., dissenting); In re Bergy, 563
F.2d at 1039-42 (Miller & Baldwin, JJ., dissenting).
86. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976).
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Protection Act of 197087 demonstrated Congress' intent that living things
are not patentable absent specific legislation.88
In Bergy, the majority expanded upon its earlier reasoning for patenting
the product inventions of Bergy and Chakrabarty.8 9 Though correctly re-
jecting the PTO's arguments that inventions employing "life" are unpat-
entable, the majority's dismissal of Flook was mechanical since Flook
speaks to the issue of natural phenomena in Bergy and to the question of
congressional intent regarding the patentability of complex new technolo-
gies. Nevertheless, an analysis of Bergy in light of Flook will reveal that
the court's affirinance of the patentability of microorganisms remains un-
changed.
A. Natural Phenomena
In remanding Bergy in light of Flook it is likely that the Supreme Court
believed Floock to raise the issue of natural phenomena in Bergy. Both
Bergy's and Chakrabarty's inventions involved natural phenomena by em-
ploying naturally occurring microorganisms as starting material. Al-
though microorganisms and the mathematical formulas at issue in Flook
are distinguishable, both involve substances or principles that are the "ba-
sic tools of scientific and technological work."9  On remand, the Bergy
majority refused to acknowledge the presence of natural phenomena, ob-
serving that the issue involved "only the construction of the terms 'manu-
facture or composition of matter."' 9 ' The court offered no support for its
position but did agree that natural phenomena are unpatentable.92 The
court, however, did not address the question of whether natural phenom-
ena constituted a significant part of the inventions.
The majority also avoided Flook's effect on the natural phenomena is-
87. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976).
88. 596 F.2d at 999. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
89. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
90. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). See also Amicus Curiae Brief for Genentech, Inc. at 4-5, In re
Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Wegner, The Patentability of "New Manufac-
tures"- The Living Invention, in 1978 COURSEBOOK, supra note 25, at 291; Kiley, Common
Sense and the Uncommon Bacterium - Is "Life" Patentable?, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 468,
471-73 (1978) (natural phenomena issue particularly apposite to Bergy's invention).
91. 596 F.2d at 965.
92. Id The court stated that "principles, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual
concepts, ideas, natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calculation, funda-
mental truths, original causes, motives, the Pythagorean theorum, and computer-implement-
able method claims" were not within § 101's category of patentable subject matter, and
summarily concluded that the "present appeals do not attempt to patent any of these
things." Id
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sue by stating that even though Flook and Bergy both construed section
101, Flook was inapplicable because it involved a "process" claim and not
a "manufacture or composition of matter," i. e., the product claim at issue
in Bergy. 93 The court's interpretation here is questionable since under this
view "process" and "product" invention cases could seldom be compared
even though they both involved construction of section 101. Moreover,
such an analysis contradicts the Supreme Court's pronouncements on sec-
tion 101 construction. For example, in Gottschalk v. Benson,94 the Court
relied on a "product" case95 to demonstrate that natural phenomena had
to be applied to a new and useful end in order to constitute part of a pat-
entable invention. The Benson Court stated: "[W]e dealt there with a
'product' claim, while the present case deals with a 'process' claim. But we
think the same principle applies." 96 Thus, contrary to the Bergy court's
rationale for dismissing Flook, "product" and "process" claims involving
construction of section 101 are to be compared. Nor is this conclusion
challengeable by distinguishing the particular section 101 issue in Benson
from that involved in Bergy since both cases involved the issue of natural
phenomena.97
In contrast to the majority's cursory disposition of the natural phenom-
ena issue, Judge Baldwin offered a better-reasoned approach in his concur-
ring opinion. He interpreted Flook to warrant an inquiry into whether
Bergy and Chakrabarty claimed natural phenomena or only new and use-
ful applications of them.98 After examining several decisions relied upon
by the Supreme Court in Flook, he concluded that in all of the decisions
the Court had employed a two-step analysis. First, the Court identified the
particular natural phenomenon used in the invention99 and then consid-
ered the inventor's claims in order to ascertain whether he was attempting
to monopolize it.' ° Thus, in Judge Baldwin's view, a claimed invention
93. Id. At the outset, the court noted that the only common element shared by the
Flook and Bergy appeals "is that they both involve section 101." Id at 964.
94. 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). See notes 48-54 and accompanying text supra.
95. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
96. 409 U.S. at 67-68. Flook impliedly reaffirmed this point by bringing Funk, a "prod-
uct" claim case, to bear upon Flook, a "process" claim case.
97. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 988-99 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
98. Id at 988.
99. The phenomenon characterized was "that which made the invention valuable to the
inventor." Id at 996. The cited cases include Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S.
127 (1948); Mackay Co. v. RCA, 306 U.S. 86 (1939); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ont.
Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); O'Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 61 (1853); Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852).
100. The unpatentable natural phenomenon in Flook was a mathematical equation used
to adjust the alarm limits on process variables in a catalytic conversion process. Since the
[Vol. 29:485
Bergy, Flook and Microorganisms
entailing a new and useful application of the phenomenon without mono-
polizing it would be held patentable.
The Bergy and Chakrabarty inventions survive the application of this
two-step inquiry. Bergy's "product" claims were not directed to naturally
occurring Sv incapable of producing lincomycin. By extracting a biologi-
cally pure culture which could produce lincomycin, Bergy sufficiently al-
tered the naturally occurring Sv to serve a useful end for the first time.
Thus, Bergy's "product" claims were directed to the useful form of Sv, not
the natural form, and did not monopolize natural phenomena; i e., the Sv
in the soil. Hence Bergy's product claim would be patentable. Similarly,
Chakrabarty altered five naturally occurring strains of the bacteria species
Pseudomonas by transplanting the genetic properties of four of them into
the fifth. This new strain could thereby digest four major components of
oil, a result no previous strain could produce. Consequently,
Chakrabarty's "product" claims likewise embodied no threat of monopoly
over a natural phenomenon.
Under Judge Baldwin's analysis, then, it is clear that the inventions of
Bergy and Chakrabarty do not claim natural phenomena but new and use-
ful applications of them and are thus not outside the categories of statutory
subject matter.'' The majority's refusal to conduct such an inquiry by
distinguishing both Flook's "process" application status and the physical
disparity in subject matter in order to avoid the natural phenomena issue
may have been ill-advised. By holding that the microorganisms do not
raise the natural phenomena issue, the court has weakened a barrier to
patentability which the Supreme Court had maintained when products of
nature were employed in an invention.° 2 As a result, it is doubtful that
patents issued on inventions such as Bergy's and Chakrabarty's will with-
other part of the claimed process entailed no more than obtaining the process-variable read-
ings and then, after solution by the computer of the equation, adjusting the alarm limits
accordingly - a known or obvious procedure and thus unpatentable under §§ 102 or 103 -
the invention essentially consisted of a mathematical procedure and therefore was also un-
patentable for having claimed natural phenemona. This analysis is not inconsistent with the
earlier explanation of the effect of Flook. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra. In
Flook, a concern over patenting natural phenomena was articulated. That concern is what
applies in Bergy. The Flook Court's incorrect application of the general standard it set forth
when it analyzed Flook's claim, however, should not be perpetuated. See In re Deihr, 602
F.2d 982, 987 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("we do not believe the Court meant to establish that
analysis as a general test");In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 809 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
101. 596 F.2d at 977 (Baldwin, J., concurring). Judge Baldwin concluded "that the
claims in both of these appeals do not reach out to encompass natural phenomena" since
they "recite only non-naturally occurring compositions of matter that are but single tools for
utilizing natural phenomena in producing new and useful results." Id
102. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
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stand challenges to patent validity that will be raised as a defense in subse-
quent infringement suits.' 0 3 In contrast, Judge Baldwin's analysis is
consistent with the Court's policy of observing the natural phenomena pro-
scription and thus is more in line with the Supreme Court's intent in re-
manding Bergy for reconsideration in light of Flook.
B. A "Clear Signalfrom Congress"
Bergy raises three issues respecting the relationship between congres-
sional action and the patentability of microorganisms. Perhaps the central
issue involves whether the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Flook,
Benson, and other new complex technology cases are to be taken as re-
stricting or even barring the patentability of product microorganism inven-
tions because Congress could not "foresee" patent applications in that
area. A second issue is whether the Plant Patent Act demonstrates that no
living matter is patentable unless specific enabling legislation is passed.
The final question is whether the existing patent law can be interpreted as
proscribing outright the patenting of living matter.
The congressional foreseeability issue, like the issue of natural phenom-
ena, was hastily dismissed by the Bergy court. Flook cites Deepsouth Pack-
ing Co. v. Laitram Corp. for the proposition that a "clear signal from
Congress" is a necessary prerequisite to granting patents in new fields un-
foreseen by Congress."° In Deepsouth, however, the Court warned
against expanding patent rights "by overruling or modifying [the Supreme
Court's] prior cases."' 5 Viewing the quotation in its original context, the
103. When a party is sued for infringement of the patentee's, or his assignee's, exclusive
right to make, use, and sell his invention, see 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976), the party commonly
will raise the defense of patent invalidity. Often the accused infringer will claim that the
invention fails to satisfy one or more of the statutory requirements of patentability such as §
101's subject matter requirement. There are at least 28 defenses to infringement actions
based upon patent invalidity. See 9 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 818 (2d
ed. 1976).
104. See 437 U.S. at 596 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S.
518, 531 (1972)).
105. 596 F.2d at 966 (quoting Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 53 1). The quotation in Deepsouth
states:
[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior cases
construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of privilege is
based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language. We
would require a clear and certain signal from Congress . . . that the beachhead of
privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously
thought.
406 U.S. at 551.
Deepsouth involved an infringement suit against a competitor by the assignee of patents
on a particular machine. The competition was manufacturing all the necessary parts for the
patented machine and then shipping them abroad where they could be assembled in under
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CCPA observed that this directive was not applicable since Bergy involved
no interpretation of a specific word or words in a patent statute requiring
prior cases to be overruled. But Flook, like Bergy, did not involve a re-
quest by a party to overrule prior cases interpreting the language of a pat-
ent statute.
Prior to quoting from the Deepsouth passage, the Flook Court cited a
"dearth of precedent" on the issue of computer program patentability and
stated its duty to "proceed cautiously when . . . asked to extend patent
rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress."' 06 The Flook Court did
not quote Deepsouth for the proposition that prior cases should not be
overruled or modified; otherwise it would not have alluded to the "dearth
of precedent" in the computer area. Rather, it relied on Deepsouth, how-
ever misguidedly, to articulate its view that caution must accompany the
consideration of patents in complex new technological fields - "areas
wholly unforeseen by Congress.' 0 7 Thus, under this interpretation of the
Deepsouth passage in Flook, the CCPA should have considered the tech-
nological problems inherent in patenting inventions in these new fields.' 08
Instead, the court denied that the inventions even comprised new technolo-
gies. Citing an admission by the PTO Solicitor that the technologies in-
volved were "not new," the court summarily agreed and concluded that
the appeals were unaffected by Flook's warning.0 9 Thus, the CCPA
shirked its duty to consider Flook's mandate to proceed cautiously in its
analysis.
To comply with Flook, however, and to consider the potential ramifica-
tions of such a complex and unforeseen technology would not necessarily
change the majority's result. It has been suggested that, if inventions in-
volve technologies "wholly unforeseen by Congress," consideration should
be given to special problems warranting Congress' consideration before
an hour. The Supreme Court rejected the assignee's claim that the competitor had "made"
his invention in violation of the infringement statute by literally interpreting the statute's
requirement that the invention be manufactured so as to be operable within the United
States. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
106. 437 U.S. at 596.
107. Id
108. One problem relates to the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). If the
organism claimed was too dangerous, it might not be patentable. See In re Anthony, 414
F.2d 1383, 1398-99 (C.C.P.A. 1969). See also notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
109. The court additionally concluded that there were no problems in examining inven-
tions from the involved fields since the PTO has been handling similar claims "for years."
In fact, however, the PTO has never handled a § 101 appeal on a "product" claim directed to
a microorganism, much less directed to a genetically altered one.
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approval of the claims." 0 Nevertheless, commentators have persuasively
argued that these types of microorganisms do not present prohibitive
problems in satisfying the statutory description requirement."' Further-
more, the PTO's claim that it lacks the necessary manpower to examine
anticipated applications for microbiological "product" patents after
Bergy112 should not be a factor in adjudicating the patentability of these
inventions. Finally, concern for health and safety, fueled by stories of the
potential spread of an andromeda strain from the molecular geneticist's
laboratory, 1 3 should be expressed to the Department of Health and
Human Services (formerly Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare), and not to courts charged with construction of the patent statutes.' "4
The issues of public concern in patenting microorganisms are analogous
to those that motivated Congress in 1946 to remove nuclear-related inven-
tions from statutory coverage, which, if patented, might have adversely
110. See Kiley, supra note 90 at 468 (Flook requires implementation of a "cautionary
approach to patenting of the cutting edge of new technology").
111. See 1978 COURSEBOOK, supra note 25, at 272.
112. In its petition for certiorari, the PTO stated that the economic implications of the
CCPA's holding in Bergy were "very significant," opening up a vast new area of patentabil-
ity. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 43, at 8-9. The "economic implications"
refer to the PTO's lack of resources with which to deal with the complex and numerous
microbiological inventions for which patent protection will be sought. This problem is
treated in the Domestic Policy Review submitted by the Department of Commerce to the
President in 1979, in which an advisory subcommittee recommended that the PTO be signif-
icantly upgraded in order to better handle applications from this and other new areas. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE DRAFT REPORT OF THE ADVISORY SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDUS-
TRIAL INNOVATION ii (December 20, 1978). The Domestic Policy Review is to provide the
basis for legislation submitted by the President.
Staffing is the preferable vehicle by which to solve the PTO's problems with microorga-
nisms. While their present difficulties do not warrant depriving inventors of patent protec-
tion, they do support expediting appropriate legislative action. Thus, instead of fighting to
defeat microorganism applications and thereby possibly slowing progress in this field, the
PTO should lobby for sufficient funds to hire personnel capable of handling the new tech-
nology.
113. See Watson, DNA Folly Continues, 180 NEw REPUBLIC 12 (January 13, 1979); In
Defense of DNA, 176 NEW REPUBLIC I I (June 25, 1977). See also Recombinant DNA Re-
search: Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080, 60,108, 60,134 (1978); Recombinant DNA:
Accelerated Processing of Patent Applications for Inventions, 42 Fed. Reg. 2,712-13 (1977),
suspended in part by Recombinant DNA: Suspension of Accelerated Processing of Patent
Applications for Recombinant DNA Research Inventions, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,147 (1977); Ber-
ger, Government Regulation of the Pursuit of Knowledge: The Recombinant DNA Contro-
versy, 3 VT. L. REV. 83 (1978). Senator Kennedy introduced legislation for strict
Recombinant DNA research guidelines but subsequently withdrew it. S. 1217, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 5335 (1977).
114. A patentee can be effectively prevented from using his or her invention by the ap-
propriate regulatory agency if it subsequently exhibits a threat to the public health. See
Amicus Curiae Brief for Genentech, Inc. at I 1-12, In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
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affected the national security." 5 However, to allow generalized concerns
over genetic engineering to bar the patenting of microbiological inventions
would thwart the efforts of researchers working toward well-defined and
clearly beneficial ends, 16 such as producing human insulin 17 or develop-
ing genetic therapy to combat deadly sickle cell anemia." 8 While the
CCPA did not articulate any of the aforementioned policy reasons in its
decision, it is possible that the court thought it necessary to avoid the
Flook warning in order to hold the inventions patentable.
The second issue in Bergy relating to congressional intent was raised by
the PTO in its broad assertion that no living organism is patentable in light
of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970." 9 The PTO argued that these Acts demonstrate that section 101 is
not applicable to "living things."' 2 °
The CCPA convincingly rejected this argument. The court stated that
the PTO had failed to consider the explicit purpose of the Plant Patent Act,
which was solely to elevate the art of plant breeding to a position of parity
with industry by allowing it also to participate in the benefits of the patent
system. The legislation was designed to permit this nonindustrial field' 2 '
to grow into a viable industry itself. '22 The court stated that the same goal
was intended in the 1970 Act. 123 Additionally, the court believed that the
PTO misused legislative history in support of its position. Its reliance on
Secretary Hyde's letter to demonstrate that the patent laws covered only
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 181; 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1976).
116. But see Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 43, at 9 ("highly controversial
policy problems [surround] genetic engineering").
117. See Ellison, Firm Pushes Ahead in Genetics, Wash. Post, July 5, 1979, § A, at 9,
col. 1.
118. Research in this area has been carried on at the University of Wisconsin Genetics
Department for the last few years. Interview with Dr. Oliver Smithies, Professor of Genet-
ics, University of Wisconsin (Nov. 29, 1979).
119. In redeciding Bergy, the court limited its consideration to "what bearing Flook has
on these appeals" and instructed the parties to limit their briefs and oral arguments accord-
ingly. 596 F.2d at 964. Despite this advice, the solicitor said during oral argument that the
PTO was depending mainly on its plant legislation argument. 1d at 978.
120. See id; notes 4 1-47 supra.
121. The experimental nature of plant development at the time is reflected in the com-
mittee reports which stated that "[tioday plant breeding and research is dependent, in large
part, upon government funds to government experiment stations, or the limited endeavors of
the amateur breeder." H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930); S. REP. No. 315,
71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930). See notes 41-47 and accompanying text supra.
122. A second, less compelling but plausible reason advanced by the CCPA was that the
Act was designed to avoid the rejection of patents on natural phenomena grounds. 596 F.2d
at 982.
123. See id at 984.
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inventions "in the field of inanimate nature"' 24 was unsupportable since
no reason existed for attributing his views to Congress. Moreover, since
his letter was merely a response to a request for his views on the proposed
participation of his department in the administration of the new Act, it
should not be given much weight.
The final issue in Bergy relating to congressional intent stems from the
PTO's argument that the CCPA should not allow the patent laws to "en-
compass living organisms - life itself."' 125 The court rejected this plea,
noting that the PTO had already granted patents on living "product" in-
ventions. 126
The PTO's argument is not only contradictory but also reflects its desire
not to deal with patent applications in this area.' 27 Furthermore, in at
least the limited context of these industrially applied microorganisms, the
"life" argument is indefensible on its face. To allow the isolated character-
istics of a claimed substance to control its patentability would, in effect,
unwarrantedly expand the utility requirement under section 101.'28 Under
the cases construing utility in section 101, a new drug, for example, is pat-
entable based on its function and not on its composition. The majority
and concurring opinions in Bergy, in evaluating the two inventions on the
basis of whether they produced the desired result and not on whether they
were "alive," followed the accepted interpretation of utility in section 101.
The new interpretation of utility embodied in the PTO's "alive" proscrip-
tion is in effect an attempt to override case law construing utility in section
101 and as such should not be voiced to the CCPA, but to Congress. 129
IV. CONCLUSION
"Product" inventions involving microorganisms are one of a group of
new technologies "wholly unforeseen by Congress" when it enacted the
124. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
125. 596 F.2d at 984.
126. Id. at 985-86 (several such patents listed).
127. See note 112 supra.
128. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
129. This proscription is supported by the fact that a knowledge gap exists between "liv-
ing" and "dead" things, which is a major reason why arguments against patenting living
things are still plausible. Great advances in microbiology are diminishing this gap, fulfilling
the prophecy of scientist Claude Bernard, who stated many years ago:
Today we differentiate three kinds of properties exhibited in phenomena of living
beings: physical properties, chemical properties, and vital properties. But the term
"vital properties" is only provisional; because we call properties vital which we
have not yet been able to reduce to physico-chemical terms; but in that we shall
doubtless succeed someday.
C. BERNARD, EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE II 2 (1957).
[Vol. 29:485
Bergy, Flook and Microorganisms
Patent Code notwithstanding the CCPA's characterizations to the con-
trary. Thus, under Parker v. Flook, the patent system must "proceed cau-
tiously" when presented with claims from complex new technologies in
order to avoid expanding the patentee's monopoly privilege beyond pres-
ent statutory limits. With microbiological inventions, this caution logically
is exercised through an inquiry into problems in meeting the health and
safety aspect of the statutory utility requirement. In In re Bergy, no
problems have been articulated by the PTO that would demand leaving
the matter to Congress.
Nevertheless, by failing to comply with the Supreme Court's Flook di-
rective and by avoiding the natural phenomena issue, the Bergy court's
position becomes more vulnerable. Unless the inventors' assignees con-
vince the Supreme Court that an actual application of Flook does not war-
rant a contrary result, the tentative status of microorganisms as patentable
subject matter under section 101 may be short-lived.
James Carroll
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